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Using personal narrative and other stories in educational research:  
Issues of validity and truthfulness. 
Morwenna Griffiths 
 
Introduction 
In this paper I argue that stories are essential in educational research, for policy and 
improving practice, including in (indeed especially in) those parts of the world which 
are not self-defined as ‘the West’. I also argue that it is essential that educational 
researchers are clear about the difference between the use of stories as research and 
their use as anecdote, rhetoric or journalism. Or, in the case of stories in other modes, 
researchers are clear about the difference between the use of songs, dances or visual 
arts as research and their use in performances or exhibitions.  
 
These ideas were developed for the First International Conference on Educational 
Research for Development, which was organised and held in Addis Ababa. The 
argument addresses a central aim of the conference: to create a global discussion 
forum on the roles of research for policy and for improving practice. The paper is 
predicated on the assumption that discussion is meaningful when the participants 
acknowledge differences and explore where useful similarities occur. Mindful of this, 
the paper focuses on issues of research methodology that are relevant globally, but 
grounds them in some specific contexts to be found in sub-Saharan Africa and in the 
Arab region, as well as in the continents of Europe and North America. This argument 
itself points to the significance of contextual as opposed to generalizable knowledge. 
The argument also points to the significance of positionality in research, and it is 
therefore important to acknowledge that I, the author, live and work in the UK and 
that this will influence and constrain my perspectives and understanding.  
 
This paper draws on an article I wrote with Gale Macleod in which we discussed how 
far narrative research provides evidence that educational policy makers can 
confidently use (Griffiths and Macleod, 2008). We were focusing on the UK context, 
but here the focus is global. The scope is wider in another sense too, since it has 
become apparent to me that the argument could encompass many modes of story 
telling. Originally we only considered stories which can be written down: stories that 
might be told orally, taped and transcribed, or that might be written down by their 
authors. But stories are often told in other ways, including through dance, song, and 
visual representation. These are, arguably, especially relevant in those parts of the 
world which depend less on the written word and where literacy is not widespread.  
 
A world of difference 
All too often, it is assumed by Westerners that knowledge generated in their own 
specific contexts is generalizable across all countries and cultures. As the Palestinian 
scholar, André Elias Mazawi says, the notions of the knowledge society and of 
development have to be understood in relation to configurations of power – national, 
regional and global – over the the backdrop of struggles which occur over what is 
defined as knowledge and what is valued as development (Mazawi, 2008a, my italics). 
Taking the example of knowledge about educational leadership, he points out that 
(Mazawi, 2008b, 80): 
The uncritical extension to the Arab region of educational leadership models 
developed in Western societies dismisses vital cultural dimensions of local 
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contexts of conflict and their political and geopolitical underpinnings. This 
effectively attracts attention away from the core social and political issues that 
impact schooling in the Arab region. It also constructs educational leadership 
in ways that operate an ontological and epistemic disjuncture between the 
experiential realities of educators and the formal ways through which their 
professional judgements and performance are assessed.  
In a thoughtful article reflecting on her years of experience as a Westerner working in 
the Education sector in Africa, Brigit Brock-Ute explores the issue of the West 
exporting assumptions about knowledge and education. She draws on the work of 
Catherine Odora, a Ugandan scholar, who (Brock-Ute, 2002, 76):  
discusses the need for creating a space in contemporary education discourse 
that is more tolerant, more sensitive to realities other than the overwhelming 
Western one. She finds that discussing indigenous education today compels us 
to come to terms with the situation in which even the social construction of a 
people's reality is and has been constantly defined elsewhere. Discussing 
indigenous education, according to Odora, ‘is about asking why the school 
building is always quadrangled even where the local setting around it has 
round huts’ (Odora, 1994: 62 - italics added by Brock-Ute). 
 
Brock-Ute and Odora also draw attention to oversimplifications and homogenisations 
found in terms such as ‘the developing world’ or  ‘sub-Saharan Africa’. Such 
oversimplifications distort the facts. Consider three countries: Botswana, Ethiopia and 
Sierra Leone. They are all in ‘the developing world’ (and we might wish to reflect on 
the oddness of the term, ‘developing world’, which implies that countries like Britain 
or Canada are not developing!); they are all African; they are all sub-Saharan; and 
they all use English as a medium of education. But there are immense differences 
between them. They each have very different histories, particularly in relation to their 
encounters with Europe and North America: their experiences of wars, conquests, 
trade, colonialisation and international aid. Their populations live in very different 
religious and cultural contexts, and they differ hugely in their physical geographies. It 
should also not be forgotten that there are big differences within each of these 
countries in terms of: languages spoken; cultural practices; living conditions in rural 
and urban areas; settlement in highlands, lowlands, deserts and forest; and political 
relationships to the government.  
 
What kinds of knowledge are needed in education? 
In the face of this kind of oversimplification and the diversity it conceals, the question 
arises: what kinds of knowledge are needed in education? Very often an emphasis is 
placed on a need for generalizable and universal knowledge: knowledge that applies 
everywhere, all the time and to everybody. The success of such knowledge in the 
physical and biological sciences may be a reason for hoping that equal success may be 
found in education. But such sciences are unaffected by the perceptions, actions, 
desires and hopes of people. For example, we may note that different human cultures 
or religions do not affect either the action of water on stone or the effect of bilharzia 
on the human intestine. But knowledge about learning how to read, to philosophise, to 
teach, or to manage a school will vary with social, physical and economic contexts.  
While there is certainly a place in educational research for the methods of the physical 
and biological sciences, the knowledge so generated can only present an incomplete 
picture, of limited usefulness for practice or policy making in specific contexts.  
 
  3 
Inevitably, the knowledge generated by the methods of physical and biological 
sciences relates to broad similarities in the members of a given population, or to their 
easily measurable attributes. There can be no doubt that these similarities and 
measurements are often significant and relevant for policy and practice.  To take just 
the examples of school attendance and literacy rates: it is useful for policy makers to 
know the percentage of the population in school for any given age range. And it may 
be useful for them to know the percentage of that population who are girls, or 
migrants, or who live in the city. Moreover it is important for policy makers to gather 
statistics about literacy levels among the population at large and also among particular 
sections of it. Equally, it is useful for teachers to know broad patterns of human 
development of language or fine motor skills if they are to teach reading and writing.  
 
While policy makers need to know these broad similarities, on their own they are not 
enough to guide policy. Attendance statistics need to be known, but if educational 
policy makers want to do something about attendance, then they need to know 
something about the reasons behind the numbers. Similarly for teachers, trying to 
decide what is best for their students. Teachers faced with non-attendance are helped 
by knowledge of broad patterns beyond their own school and classroom. But they also 
need to know the particular conditions facing their own students. Again, statistics on 
literacy need to be known but policy makers may need to know more about why some 
students are not literate, and why some sections of the student population (girls, 
migrants, urban dwellers) are more (or less) literate than others. Teachers need to 
know much more about the individual and groups of human beings who are their 
students, before they can decide on the best approach to teaching literacy.  
 
The previous paragraph was written as if ‘schooling’, ‘school attendance’ and 
‘literacy’ were well understood concepts across countries and cultures. If that were 
true, perhaps there would be only a little contextualisation needed to augment the 
generalized knowledge.  But that would be to oversimplify the complexity of 
educational policy and practice. All of these terms come laden with cultural, social, 
economic, historical, religious and political overtones which affect how they are 
understood in different contexts. Even in the West it can be difficult to collect cross-
national statistics on these matters, because different understandings hold about what 
counts as school (rather than, say, college or university or apprenticeship) or 
attendance (how much attendance counts as attendance?) or literacy (what level, what 
medium, what way of testing is relevant?).  Similarly for literacy, which I discuss in 
more detail in the next section.  
 
The example of literacy. 
In this section I use specific examples to point up some of the complexities in 
thinking about literacy,  introduced by differences between and within different 
countries. In doing so I am also demonstrating the power of the individual, context-
dependent, human story to show situations which are not generalizable, but which are 
instructive. They show specific educational situations and issues which can illuminate 
different but equally specific educational situations and issues which are similar but 
not identical. At the end of the paper I return to this question of instructive and 
illuminating knowledge.  
 
The first situation I offer comes from Botswana. Botswana, like so many countries, 
has many peoples in it, including the San people (formerly known to much of the 
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world as Bushmen). Imagine the scene. I am visiting a Year 5 class (ages 9 and 
upward) in a  school deep in rural Botswana. It has taken hours to reach it from the 
nearest small town, driving not on tar but on deep sand. It is indeed, as Catherine 
Odoro says, one of the few rectangular buildings in the village. Another one is the 
small shop and bar. Otherwise the buildings are neat, round houses each set in a 
fenced compound. The school group of buildings includes the teachers’ homes. The 
teachers live apart from the rest of the village in rectangular government houses. 
Unlike the villagers who are all San people, they are native speakers of Setswana. The 
language of education is Setswana and English. I take a photograph of one of the 
children. It would be hard to tell from the photograph that she is not from the UK. She 
sits at a desk, in her blue uniform (provided by the government), resting her hand on 
her cheek, her elbow on her desk, her pencil in her hand, looking down at the exercise 
book in which she should be writing. In my experience, children in primary schools 
often look like this: writing is difficult.  
 
The next situation comes from the UK. This time I am visiting a city school for pupils 
with severe or profound learning disabilities. Again I take a photograph, this time of 
two teenagers. They are learning to make films using video. Many of them 
communicate much better through visual means than through words or writing.  I am 
there so that they can interview me as part of their project. My photograph shows two 
young people and a technician standing round the tripod where the video camera is 
mounted. Later they will learn to edit it and integrate the interview into a longer film 
for a CD.  
 
The third situation I offer is again from a rural primary school, but this time in the 
USA. I took a photograph when I was there, doing some research with the teacher in a 
first year class (ages 6-7). The picture shows a corner of this well-stocked classroom 
of about twenty pupils. A child at the front is sitting at a desk, working at a large sheet 
of paper, making a story book by drawing and writing. In the background is a large 
display board decorated with cartoon characters, with speech bubbles coming out of 
their mouths. Children’s work is mounted on the board, under the heading ‘Our 
Wintry Work’. (There was deep snow outside.) Above this is another notice: 
‘WRITING’. There is also a set of shelves with boxes of writing implements and piles 
of paper for the children to use.  
 
Each of these situations are ones in which literacy is being taught. All of them are 
state schools: these students are benefiting from the ordinary policy and practice of 
their countries. However the differences are immediate, striking and significant. What 
is the meaning of literacy for the San child? And what literacy policy and pedagogical 
practices are appropriate for her? She is learning to write in her second or third 
language; her classroom has a few books, all text books; the displays are posters from 
the education ministry; her home and village contains very little printed material of 
any kind and very little electronic equipment either (she will be pleased to get a copy 
of my photograph); she is unlikely to go on to secondary, let alone tertiary education 
(though it is possible). In contrast, the Primary 1 children in the USA are learning to 
write in their first language; the classroom is full of books and other printed material, 
including text books but also including books and posters for the children simply to 
enjoy; the children come from homes full of printed material of all kinds, even if their 
parents are not well-educated, and there is an abundance of electronic devices, 
including computers, cameras, recorders and mobile phones. All these children will 
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continue their education at secondary level and most of them at tertiary level too. The 
teenagers in the UK are different again. They have severe learning disabilities, but are 
able to achieve a beginning of media literacy, something that must become 
increasingly relevant as electronic communication expands. However they, like the 
children in the USA, are surrounded by print and books, at school and at home. It is 
likely that in spite of their learning disabilities they will be able to understand a lot 
about public communications and the uses of verbal and visual literacies. One of these 
teenagers confidently and competently presented a talk, using visual material, to a 
lecture hall full of student teachers on a teacher education course.  
 
Similar differences can be found between schools in the same country, especially 
large, heterogeneous ones. Ethiopia provides just one example. Again with reference 
to literacy, consider primary schools in Addis Ababa and schools in rural Tigray. 
They can be compared using many of the same factors I used in my international 
comparisons. The schools can be compared in terms of first language of children, the 
amount of printed material in the classroom and in the environment outside the 
school, familiarity with electronic communication, and the chances of going on to 
secondary and tertiary stages. All of these factors are significant when deciding 
national and local policy and all of them will constrain teaching approaches.  
 
A literacy statistic will hide these significant differences. Further, the definition of 
literacy used in the statistics will hide different sets of factors. Commonly used 
definitions of literacy will give very different results (and imply different strategies) 
for these children. One widely used criterion in sub-Saharan Africa, ‘the ability to 
read easily or with difficulty a letter or a newspaper’, may be compared with another 
equally widely used, ‘can with understanding both read and write a short simple 
statement on his or her everyday life’. (See Aitcheson and Alidou, 2009.) What do 
those two statements mean to the San child? to the American child? to the British 
teenager? or to the Ethiopian child in the city of Addis Ababa or in rural Tigray? The 
meaning attached to a letter or a newspaper is not the same cross culturally. Even the 
ability to write a short statement will mean something different to a child in a 
community where literacy is needed and assumed, and to a child where it is not. So 
what policy is needed about literacy levels? And how should teachers approach the 
task of teaching children to read and to use electronic communication? (And how 
should teacher educators use research to help them do that?)  
 
Trustworthy narratives 
I have been using narratives drawn from my experience. I offer them as a way of 
grounding an abstract argument about the meaning and conditions of literacy. I hope 
they have achieved their purpose of drawing attention to the significance of 
understanding specific contexts in order to interpret information gathered more 
generally. I also hope they have achieved their purpose of showing how assumptions 
that are made by Westerners about those contexts may be seriously mistaken. 
 
The stories I told are not the products of research. They function in this argument as 
rhetoric and anecdote. You, the reader, may believe them, but equally you may be 
sceptical. For me, the story teller, they are part of my own personal knowledge, but I 
am well aware that they are not validated in any way that would mean that you, the 
reader, have good reason to trust them. To take this point further, I may have tried to 
be strictly faithful to the facts or I may have fictionalised some aspects of the stories, 
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perhaps in order to maintain confidentiality, or to bring together various aspects of the 
truth as I perceive it. My hope is that you may recognise them as being true enough 
for you to learn from. But perhaps they do not ring true for you.  
 
I now go on to argue that it is possible to produce trustworthy knowledge of particular 
contexts of the kind that educational research can provide. To put this in more 
technical language, I argue for an epistemology of the unique and particular. This is a 
phrase I have taken from the philosopher Adriana Cavarero (2002). I also argue that 
this is a kind of knowledge that is needed by policy makers and teachers. Just as with 
the more familiar epistemology of the general and universalizable, an epistemology of 
the unique and particular must have a means of establishing sound, trustworthy 
knowledge. Research representations of the unique and particular might take the form 
of narrative, story, song, poem, performance or image, and there must be a way of 
distinguishing them from other narratives, stories, songs, poems, performances or 
images which do not have this status.  
 
In order to make the argument I first present some technical terms drawn from 
Aristotle. Aristotle’s useful distinctions are usually discussed using his original Greek 
terms because they have no simple translation in English (and were technical uses of 
common words even in ancient Greece).  Aristotle distinguished the practical wisdom 
(phronesis) needed to work with practical knowledge (praxis) from the theoretical 
wisdom (sophia) and theoretical understanding (episteme) needed to carry out enquiry 
into timeless truths (theoria).  Praxis is the kind of practical knowledge needed for the 
social and moral judgements made by the phronimos (the possessor of phronesis).  
Aristotle also distinguished practical wisdom (phronesis) from the expertise (techne) 
needed to apply technical knowledge (poiesis) when making things.   
 
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle shows that all three of these kinds of 
knowledge are required, and each are characteristic of different purposes. Knowledge 
of timeless truths is, for Aristotle, the most excellent kind of knowledge. It is 
undertaken for its own sake out of a sense of wonder and of a pure desire to know. It 
should not be confused with praxis, which is the knowledge that is needed for 
working with human beings (for example, in policy making and teaching). Nor should 
it be confused with poiesis, which is the knowledge that is used to control the physical 
or biological worlds (for example, in engineering, surgery or the manufacture of 
household objects like cups or chairs).  
 
The success of technical knowledge in engineering, medicine and manufacturing has 
led some people to hope that education, too, can be improved through technical 
means. But this is to confuse two kinds of knowledge, praxis and techne. As Cavarero 
helpfully puts it, praxis is concerned with  the 'shared and relational space generated 
by the words and deeds of a plurality of human beings' (Cavarero, 2002, p.506). 
Techne, is different.  Joseph Dunne explains:  
Techne is the kind of knowledge possessed by an expert maker: it gives him a 
clear conception of the why and wherefore, the how and with-what of the 
making process and enables him, through the capacity to offer a rational account 
of it, to preside over his activity with secure mastery. (Dunne, 1993, p. 9) 
In contrast, praxis requires personal wisdom and understanding, not just expertise. To 
quote Dunne again:  
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[Praxis] is conduct in a public space with others in which a person, without 
ulterior purpose and with a view to no object detachable from himself, acts in 
such a way as to realise excellences that he has come to appreciate in his 
community as constitutive of a worthwhile way of life. ... praxis required for its 
regulation a kind of knowledge that was more personal and experiential, more 
supple and less formulable, than the knowledge conferred by techne. (1993, p. 
10) 
 
Dunne’s explanation mentions knowledge that is personal and experiential. That is, it 
is made up of evidence gathered personally as well as from others, and applied with 
intelligence, judgement and logic. Knowledge of this sort is only rarely expressed in 
the form of generalities. Rather, it is remembered as stories (critical incidents in the 
past or memories of particular teachers or pupils, for instance), or as guidelines (such 
as, ‘It is better to do mathematics lessons in the mornings when the students are 
fresh,’ or ‘Do not make a threat you will not carry out.’) Such knowledge may be 
expressed in images, in dialogue about shared experience, in gesture, or, perhaps, in 
metaphors or poems. In this article I focus on stories, rather than guidelines.  
 
Personal and experiential knowledge need not remain simply personal. It can be 
expressed in ways which make it more publicly available. To do this requires 
attention to making it sound and trustworthy. There are two ways in which soundness 
and trustworthiness may be challenged.  Firstly it may be challenged on the grounds 
of truth.  Secondly its validity may be challenged. In the next two sections I consider 
each in turn, drawing on Bernard Williams’ useful distinctions between truth and 
truthfulness, and between accuracy and sincerity (Williams, 2002).  
 
Truth and truthfulness 
The question of truth is complicated: there are difficult issues about its nature.  Some 
researchers claim that truth does not exist at all, though there may be many truths. 
These multi-sided and complex discussions take place throughout the social sciences 
and the humanities. Education is no exception. David Bridges (2003) summarises 
some mainstream philosophical discussions about different theories of truth 
(correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, etc) in relation to education. Other recent 
discussions of truth in relation to educational research, can be found in Heikkenen et 
al. (2000, 2001), Hulton (2001), MacLure (2003) and in Walker and Unterhalter 
(2004).  
 
Bernard Williams usefully suggests that for many research purposes it is more 
productive and constructive to focus on truthfulness than on truth. There is a well-
known problem with truth. Two people may report on the same thing absolutely 
truthfully, and yet, owing to their differing perspectives and preconceptions, their 
accounts may not be the same in important respects. The likelihood is that only 
society’s dominant perspectives and preconceptions will come to be called ‘the truth’, 
and this leads to widespread misconceptions. Williams points out that sceptics about 
truth within the humanities and social sciences are bothered by precisely this problem. 
That is, as he puts it, they exhibit ‘this demand for truthfulness or (to put it less 
positively) this reflex against deceptiveness’ even though they are sceptical about 
truth itself (Williams, 2002, p. 1).  
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Williams goes on to discuss truthfulness. He distinguishes two basic virtues 
associated with truthfulness: accuracy and sincerity. Judging accuracy and sincerity is 
a matter for judgement, for weighing evidence, for weighing up reasons to trust the 
teller. It is difficult to do.  There are no infallible rules to guide these judgements 
about truth. However it is a familiar difficulty which we human beings overcome in 
order simply to carry on living in families, communities and society at large.  In 
ordinary life we listen to and tell stories all the time.  We need to judge how far they 
are accurate and told with sincerity.  We know, and indeed expect, them to be partial, 
self-serving, entertaining, persuasive and to draw on imperfect memories. Judgements 
are even more difficult in the case of fictionalised accounts and poetic or visual 
representations (Bridges, 2003).  Again, it is a familiar difficulty. Myths, fables, 
riddles and images are used the world over to convey truths. Ethiopia has a tradition 
of azmari singers who are sometimes tell uncomfortable truths in satirical verse. 
These familiar difficulties are an inevitable part of understanding the unique and 
particular, the singular and individual voice.  
 
Researchers, like everyone else, need to make judgements of truthfulness. Of course, 
they do this at a personal level, producing personal knowledge, but research is public 
knowledge. Therefore, researchers need to make their judgements public and also to 
give an indication of the reasons for the way in which their judgements were reached.  
So a researcher needs to present the audience with evidence of how stories were 
produced, with what intended audience, and for what purpose. All of these factors 
affect accuracy and sincerity.  
 
Validity: quantitative and qualitative  
The previous section discussed truth and truthfulness in relation to the trustworthiness 
of personal narratives and stories. In this section I turn to the related question about 
how validity can be established.  Most discussions within educational research use 
assumptions that have been drawn from the physical and biological sciences: from 
epistemologies of the general and universal, where numeric measurement is a basic 
tool. These sciences have developed a specialised, technical vocabulary of validity 
which suits their purposes. For the natural sciences, ‘validity’ determines whether the 
research truly measures that which it was intended to measure or how truthful the 
research results are. Not surprisingly this meaning has not translated to educational 
research very easily, especially for research which does not rely on measurement. But 
social science and the humanities need not, and should not, expect to take up a 
meaning that has been evolved for quite another epistemology. It is more useful to 
return to a more ordinary understanding of the term validity. This more ordinary 
understanding does not require either measurement or certainty.  
 
The usual meaning of ‘validity’ can to be found in dictionary definitions. J.L. Austin’s 
comment applies. He argued that distinctions ‘in ordinary language work well for 
practical purposes’ and this is ‘no mean feat’ (Austin, 1979, 185). These distinctions 
build on what generations of human beings have needed to say when making 
judgements about the stories they are told. Dictionaries tell us that ‘valid’ was not 
originally a word especially associated with measurement; it comes from the Latin 
word, ‘validus’, which means ‘strong’. The dictionary definition gives four ways in 
which evidential strength may be found. Merriam-Webster (2006-7) provides the 
following four current definitions: (1) legal efficacy or force; (2) well grounded or 
justifiable: being at once relevant and meaningful; (3) having a conclusion correctly 
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derived from premises; (4) appropriate to the end in view – effective (as in every craft 
has its valid method’. The first of these evidently does not apply to educational 
research methods. The second, third and fourth are relevant, however.  
 
The second dictionary definition of ‘valid’ draws attention to the way that a story 
might be truthful – both accurately and sincerely told – and yet not be relevant to the 
matter in hand. For a story to be relevant and meaningful it needs to be shown to be so 
with regard to its representativeness and/or the possibility it provides of re-framing 
the understanding of what is at issue. Sometimes narratives are significant precisely 
because they are ordinary. That is, they show something of the lived experience of 
ordinary life in all its complexity and with all the everyday differences between 
contexts. They are unique, individual, personal - but they are not atypical. That is their 
significance. The significance may arise because the stories of some individuals are 
rarely heard. In contrast, narratives may be significant precisely because they are not 
ordinary.  
 
An example of how representativeness is significant in story, is provided by stories of 
people with low educational achievement in school. Two of the stories I told earlier 
are examples of such people. The teenagers I described learning to use video in the 
special school achieve very low results in comparison to other teenagers. These 
teenagers are, I think, ‘not atypical’. That is, I think they are broadly representative of 
teenagers with their level of learning difficulty. There is a lot of quantitative and 
qualitative research available about such young people. The stories of these two 
specific teenagers could add to this research, by showing something of their specific 
experiences, capabilities, aspirations, pleasures and frustrations in one school noted 
for its excellent provision in the creative arts. A unfocused, generalised view of pupils 
with special needs can become clearer and sharper. While I would expect their 
individual stories to challenge what we think we know about such young people, if I 
were using the stories as research I would need to establish how representative they 
are, and situate their stories within the context of similar ones.  
 
I also described a San child learning to write. She is achieving low results in 
comparison to children her age elsewhere in Botswana and in the world. She is unlike 
the special needs students in the UK, in that stories and narratives from and about 
children like her are hardly ever heard publicly. There is very limited published 
research and knowledge available. As far as I know, she, like the UK teenagers, is 
ordinary: not atypical. But she is different from the teenagers in that voices like hers 
hardly figure in educational debates about policy and practice even in her own 
country, let alone in the rest of the world. So her story is worth telling regardless of 
whether she is individually exceptional. Her story would open a window onto a little 
noticed way of being. She is one of our own, a citizen of our world, equal in value to 
all of us, and she deserves to be represented; yet she has been marginalised. If I were 
presenting her story as research I would need to establish these views of mine by 
referring to policy and research on and with San people. 
 
A third story of somebody with low educational achievement is provided by the world 
famous physicist, Albert Einstein. Einstein, as is well known, was not very successful 
at school. He got high marks in maths and physics, but not in other subjects. His 
schoolmaster wrote in his school report, ‘He will never amount to anything.’ He 
himself did not like school. He is reported as saying, ‘One had to cram all this stuff 
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into one's mind for the examinations, whether one liked it or not. This coercion had 
such a deterring effect on me that, after I had passed the final examination, I found the 
consideration of any scientific problems distasteful to me for an entire year.’ 
Einstein’s story helps us, as educators, to reframe the issue of low educational 
achievement. He is not representative of most ordinary people: years after his death he 
is still one of the most famous people in the world. He is not rarely heard: he is very 
famous and his opinions can easily be found in various forms of publication. But 
stories like his are relevant to educational policy makers and teachers who too often 
frame low educational achievement as a matter of either innate ability or socio-
economic conditions. Non-representative stories can help re-frame our views of low 
achievement, and so make us rethink educational policy and practice. 
 
I have been arguing that the second dictionary definition shows that validity requires 
attention to issues of representativeness, marginalisation and framing. The third of the 
dictionary definitions of validity draws attention to the kinds of conclusion that would 
be drawn from a truthful narrative, even after these issues have been  considered. 
‘Having a conclusion correctly derived from premises’ is a more complex matter for 
story and performance than it is for logic and mathematics. The key issues here are 
representation, genre and literary quality. Representation refers to the way that a story 
is presented, not only by the teller, artist or performer, but also by the researcher, who 
is representing it (or, more accurately, re-representing it). All representation involves 
judgements and choices about editing,  framing and form. Judgments and choices also 
need to be made about whether to present a representation as finished and definite or 
as just one possible presentation among many. Further decisions relate to genre which 
refers to the way that any story is influenced by the genres available – both to the 
original presenter and to the researcher. For instance, in the West, there tends to be an 
expectation of there being a hero(ine), who comes to a happy or tragic ending, 
perhaps with a moral attached. Other cultures will draw on their own artistic 
repertoires of particular characters and story lines.   
 
The fourth of the dictionary definitions is also relevant. Literary and artistic quality is 
part of the craft of representation. Literary quality draws on genre, but, for some 
researchers, it can also be a wider concern than this. It refers to the power of a verbal, 
visual or performative representation to move people in the audience in some way: to 
make them think, and re-think; to make them feel differently or to empathise. Renuka 
Vithal calls this ‘transformacy’: the potential for a representation to effect 
transformative change in the reader (Vithal, 2002).   
 
This discussion of the three relevant dictionary definitions of ‘valid’ draws attention 
to the significance of reflexivity on the part of the researcher. Reasons for trust and 
judgement are probably partly implicit and partly the result of experience. The 
audience for the research needs to make a judgment about how far to trust the 
evidence. All qualitative presentations are subject to a range of interpretations. 
Research accounts will be understood and interpreted according to what is known 
about the intentions and ideologies of the researcher, and of the personal and power 
relationships that structured the research. Gaps and silences may be noted. Intentions 
may be assessed. The relation between the story presenter, her audience and the 
researcher is brought into focus. Explicit reflexivity on the part of the researcher 
allows the reader to determine how much weight to place on the evidence presented.  
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Truthful and valid stories. 
I began by remarking that it is important to be able to tell the difference between 
stories used as research and other kinds of personal story, including anecdote, 
rhetoric, journalism, art for its own sake, parable and gossip. Stories used as research 
need to be demonstrably trustworthy in relation to their truth and validity. Further, as 
in all research, the story a researcher tells has itself to be shown to be trustworthy. So 
it is the responsibility of researchers to present research in such a way that judgements 
can be made about its truthfulness and validity by their audiences. To enable this, 
sound research needs to show that the researcher has taken account of the following.  
(1) Truthfulness: accuracy and sincerity.  
(2) Representativeness.  
(3) Representation.  
(4) Genre. 
(5) Literary quality.  
(6) Reflexivity. 
Researchers need to set their judgments within their understanding of the cultural, 
social, political and personal contexts. 
 
What difference does all this make? 
Personal narrative and stories use an epistemology of the unique and the particular. 
The knowledge that they generate is not the same as knowledge that comes from 
epistemologies of the general and universal. There are no timeless truths to be 
uncovered. There are no laws to be formulated. Contextual knowledge is probably 
more useful than generalised knowledge when formulating and carrying out complex 
educational policy or when carrying on the complicated business of teaching. For 
these purposes factual knowledge is less useful than qualities of understanding and 
wisdom. Stories made public and understood within the framework of individual 
experiences help cultivate these qualities. They show us other aspects of our world 
and in doing so illuminate our own small part of it. They help us question what we 
have taken for granted, to broaden our comprehension, and to deepen our insights.  
 
Personal narratives and other stories in educational research are also a way for the 
majority of the world to put the knowledge constructed in the West into its place: 
useful, but only insofar as it is relevant to the particular contexts at hand. Thus, stories 
are an essential tool for developing countries in formulating their their own solutions 
and resolutions to their own educational issues and problems. In the long run there 
might even be the happy possibility that Westerners’ self-belief in their own rightness 
and universality might be shaken.  
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